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Judgments

Securities and Exchange Board of India vs Ajay Agarwal  [SUPREME COURT OF INDIA, 25 Feb 2010]
(A) Securities Exchange Board of India - Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992, ss. 4(3), 11 and 11-B - Show cause notice was issued to the respondent (Joint Managing Director of a company) u/s. 11-B of the Act - After giving an opportunity of personal hearing to respondent, Chairman of the Board passed an order u/s. 11-B of the Act - On appeal, Appellate Tribunal was of the view that the provision of s. 11-B of the Act cannot be invoked in respect of the alleged misconduct which took place at a point of time when s. 11-B of the Act was not on the statute book - Hence present appeal - Held, s. 11-B of the Act which empowers the Board to issue certain directions came up by way of amendment in 1995 - Statements of Objects and Reasons of such amendments show one of the objects is to empower the Board to issue regulations without the approval of the Central Government - In the absence of any challenge to those provisions, it cannot be said that even though Board is statutorily empowered to exercise functions in accordance with the amended law, its power to act under the law, as amended, will stand frozen in respect of any violation which might have taken place prior to the enactment of those provisions - Further, provisions of s. 11-B of the Act being procedural in nature can be applied retrospectively - Appellate Tribunal made a manifest error by not appreciating that s. 11-B is procedural in nature - Order of the Appellate Tribunal set aside - Order of the Chairman of the Board upheld - Appeal allowed.

(B) Constitution - Securities Exchange Board of India - Constitution of India, 1950, art. 20(1) - Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992, ss. 4(3), 11, 11(4)(b) and 11-B - Protection against ex-post facto laws - It was urged by respondent that on the date when the violations were alleged against him, the Board did not have the power either u/s. 11-B or u/s. 11(4)(b) as those provisions came subsequently by way of amendment - Held, protection u/art. 20(1) of the Constitution in respect of ex-post facto laws, is a Fundamental Right guaranteed under Constitution only in a case where a person is charged of having committed an "offence" and is subjected to a "penalty" - In the instant case, the respondent has not been held guilty of committing any offence nor has he been subjected to any penalty - Order of restrain for a specified period cannot be equated with punishment for an offence as has been defined under the General Clauses Act - Protection u/art. 20(1) of the Constitution in respect of ex-post facto laws is not available to the respondent - Appeal allowed.

(C) Securities Exchange Board of India - Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992, ss. 4(3), 11 and 11-B - Whether s. 11-B of the Act could be invoked by the Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Board) in conjunction with ss. 4(3) and 11 for restraining the respondent from associating with any corporate body in accessing the securities market and prohibiting him from buying, selling or dealing in securities? - Held, impugned order was passed by the Board in exercise of its power u/s. 4(3) r/w s. 11 and s. 11-B of the said Act - Such power is given to the Board u/s. 11(4)(b) of the Act - Therefore, restrain order passed on the respondent strictly speaking was not u/s. 11-B of the said Act - However, the provisions of s. 11(4)(B) of the Act also came by way of amendment in 2002 - Even if the amendments to the said Act are allowed to operate prospectively by the time the order was passed by the Board, it was empowered by the aforesaid amendments to do so - Therefore, without giving any retrospective operation to those provisions, the impugned order can be passed by the Board in as much as the amendments in questions empowered the Board to pass such an order when it passed the order - Even if the law applies prospectively, the Board cannot be prevented from acting in terms of the law which exists on the day the Board passed its order - Appeal allowed.
Alchemist Asset Reconstruction Company Limited vs ICICI Bank Limited and Others  [PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT, 16 Feb 2010]
National Small Industries Corporation Limited vs Harmeet Singh Paintal and Another  [SUPREME COURT OF INDIA, 15 Feb 2010]
(A) Criminal - Corporate - Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, ss. 138 and 141 - Complaint u/s. 138 - Dishonour of cheque - Liability of Director of company - Appellants filed complaints u/s. 138 r/w s. 141 of the Act against a Company, its Managing Director and Director - Metropolitan Magistrate summoned the accused persons - Application filed by respondent (director of company) before the Additional Sessions Judge dropping of proceedings against him was dismissed - Respondent filed a petition u/s. 482, CrPC - HC, after finding that the averments against respondent No.1 were unspecific and general and no particular role was assigned to him, quashed the summoning orders passed against him - Hence, present appeal - Whether the complaint in present cases satisfied the necessary ingredients to attract s. 141 of the Act insofar as the respondents, namely, Directors of the company are concerned? - Held, in the absence of specific averment as to the role of the respondents and particularly in view of the acceptable materials that at the relevant time they were in no way connected with the affairs of the company, judgment of HC upheld - Appeals dismissed.

(B) Criminal - Corporate - Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, ss. 138 and 141 - Complaint u/s. 138 - Dishonour of cheque - What should be the averments in the complaint u/s. 138 r/w s. 141 of the Act against the Director of a Company before he can be subjected to criminal proceedings - Held, liability arises from being in-charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company at the relevant time when the offence was committed and not on the basis of merely holding a designation or office in a company - Complaint should spell out as to how and in what manner Director was in-charge of or was responsible to the accused company for the conduct of its business - Further, primary responsibility is on the complainant to make specific averments as are required under the law in the complaint so as to make the accused vicariously liable - Appeals dismissed.

(C) Criminal - Corporate - Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, ss. 138 and 141 - Complaint u/s. 138 - Dishonour of cheque - Vicarious liability - Averments in petition - Held, vicarious liability on the part of a person must be pleaded and proved and not inferred - Vicarious liability can be inferred against a company only if the requisite statements, which are required to be averred in the complaint/petition, are made so as to make accused therein vicariously liable for offence committed by company along with averments in the petition containing that accused were in-charge of and responsible for the business of the company and by virtue of their position they are liable to be proceeded with - Appeals dismissed.

(D) Criminal - Corporate - Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, ss. 138 and 141 - Complaint u/s. 138 - Dishonour of cheque - Vicarious liability of Director or Managing Director of company - Averments in petition - Held, if accused is Managing Director or Joint Managing Director then it is not necessary to make specific averment in the complaint and by virtue of their position they are liable to be proceeded with - Further, if accused is a Director or an Officer of a company who signed the cheques on behalf of the company then also it is not necessary to make specific averment in complaint - Appeals dismissed.
(1) Suresh Anandraj Jain; (2) Ujwala Paraschand Jain; (3) Tatiya Credit Corporation; (4) Paraschand Anandraj Jain; (5) Chanchala Devi Sureshchand Jain; (6) Paras and Company vs Union of India, Through its B. T. Pali  [BOMBAY HIGH COURT, 11 Feb 2010]
Income Tax & Direct Taxes - Corporate - Criminal - Income Tax Act, 1961, ss. 238, 274 and 276 - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, s. 482 - Willful attempt to evade tax - Concealment of the income - Notice was issued to the applicants (partners of a firm) u/s. 274 r/w s. 271(1)(c) of the Act for concealment of the income - Appeals filed thereagainst before Commissioner of Income Tax and Income Tax Appellate Tribunal were dismissed - Applicants were held liable for prosecution for the offences for making attempt to evade payment of taxes and for making false verification in the return of income - Present application seeking quashing of cases for an offence punishable u/s 276C, 277 r/w 238 of the Act - Held, issue whether the applicants can be punished u/s. 276C for the offence committed u/s. 278B of the Act by the firm or not can be considered after trial and after giving opportunity to both the sides to lead the evidence - Applications devoid of any merit - Applications dismissed.
Stichting Doen-Postcode Loterij vs Vin Poly Recyclers Private Limited and Others  [DELHI HIGH COURT, 10 Feb 2010]
Corporate - Practice & Procedure - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, o. 37 - Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985, s. 22 - Suit for recovery of money - Plaintiff instituted suit u/o. 37 of CPC for recovery of money - Defendant applied for leave to defend - Arguments on the application for leave to defend were addressed by the counsel for the parties and order thereon reserved - Defendant made a reference to BIFR and the reference was registered and the bar of s. 22 of the SICA invoked - Plaintiff contended that since nothing remained to be ‘proceeded with’ in the suit, s. 22 of Act did not apply - Single judge held that s. 22 r/w. s. 32 of SICA mandates that SICA would prevail over other laws and exceptions are provided however CPC is not an exception to the said general rule - Whether single judge’s order could be upheld? - Held, literal meaning of s. 22 of the Act is that the status as prevailing on the date of applicability of s. 22 of Act is to remain unless the permission of BIFR to proceed further is obtained - Purport of s. 22 of Act was to protect a sick company from the legal proceedings of the nature mentioned in s. 22 of Act - Prior to amendment thereof, suits were not included and the bar applied only to execution proceedings - However, after the amendment in the year 1994, the legislature deemed it appropriate to bar the institution of as well as proceeding further with all the suits against such sick companies - Appeal dismissed
Mahesh Ratilal Shah vs Union of India and Others  [SUPREME COURT OF INDIA, 19 Jan 2010]
(A) Securities Exchange Board of India - Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956 - Constitution of India, 1950, art. 226 – De-recognition of Stock Exchanges - Petitioner (sub-broker) filed a writ petition before HC for a direction to the UOI and Securities and Exchange Board of India (Board) to withdraw the recognition granted to Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) and to declare the Rules, Bye-laws and Regulations of the BSE as illegal, void and ultra vires the Act and the Constitution - Writ petition was dismissed - Hence, present special leave petition - Whether it can be said, as has been urged on behalf of the petitioner, that in listing the shares of the company on the Stock Exchange, the BSE acted in a manner which failed to ensure fair dealing and to protect the investors? - HC held that the writ petition, which was lacking in particulars relating to the constitutional challenge, was not the appropriate remedy for the petitioner, who, along with a member of the Stock Exchange, had traded in the shares of the company - HC also noted that no material had been produced by the petitioner for issuing directions for de-recognition of the BSE or to declare its Rules, Bye-laws and Regulations to be illegal, void and ultra vires - Held, view of HC was correct - Petitioner was not able to make out any case of mala fides or irregularity on the part of the BSE with regard to the listing and subsequent de-listing of the scrip of the company - Special Leave Petition dismissed

(B) Securities Exchange Board of India - Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956 - Constitution of India, 1950, art. 226 - Non-publication of the Bye- laws - Effect thereof - Whether in the absence of publication of the Rules and Bye-laws of the BSE, which had been framed prior to its recognition in 1956 under the Act, its activities could be said to be without authority? - Held, views of the Bombay HC in V. Ruia vs. S. Dalmia 1966 INDLAW MUM 46 that since the said Rules and Bye-laws had been in existence from long before the enactment of the Act and the grant of recognition to the Stock Exchange, the same did not require publication in terms of s. 4 of the Act are correct - Further, while the Act provides for publication of amendments to the Rules and Bye-laws after grant of recognition, the Act is silent with regard to the publication of the pre-recognition Rules or Bye-laws which were already in existence and had been acted upon all along - Special Leave Petition dismissed.
Deepika Vijay Nihalani vs INA Stock Broking Company Private Limited  [BOMBAY HIGH COURT, 15 Jan 2010]
Arbitration & ADR - Securities Exchange Board of India - Petitioner alleged that respondent, without any instructions from the petitioner kept on trading in the name of petitioner in the stock market without sending any contract notes or bills or even demanding any margin money - Respondent issued notice to petitioner to pay a sum being the alleged debit balance standing in the account of the petitioner with the respondent - Petitioner denied her liability to pay any amount to the Respondent - Respondent filed Arbitration Reference before the Arbitration Committee of the Bombay Stock Exchange - Award was passed by the Arbitrator - Hence, present petitions - Respondents case was that petitioners accepted and acknowledged the contract notes without any objection and all trades were done as per the specific instructions of the petitioners - Held, respondents have placed on record duly executed and signed documents, provided that the petitioner had complied and completed all the formalities, as per the Bye­laws and Rules of SEBI and got enrolled them as constituent and became beneficial owner of Depository Participant (DP) - In view of above, it is clear that the Arbitration under the Rules and Bye­laws and Regulations of Bombay Stock Exchange (the bye­laws) as filed and as decided even though the existence of the agreement itself was agitated, as the difference and dispute arising out of the Agreement/contract between the parties, as contemplated under the bye­laws, 226(a) and 226(c) - Respondent’s case of giving credit for the Petitioner for every transaction and the statement of account and the confirmation of account by acknowledging the same by the Petitioners, is also substantiated by the documents and the same cannot be controverted by the petitioners - No reason to interfere with the award - Petitions dismissed.
Iccon Oil And Specialities Limited, Represented by Director, Tushar H. Shah vs (1) Union of India; (2) Appellate Authority for Industrial & Financial Reconstruction, New Delhi; (3) Board for Industrial Financial Reconstruction (BIFR), New Delhi; (4) Development Commissioner (Ind.) Department of Industries; (5) Central Bank of India, BIFR Cell; (6) Union Bank of India; (7) State Bank of Indore, Madhya Pradesh; (8) Direcetor General, ESIC, New Delhi; (9) General Secretary, Bharatiya Kamgar Karmachari Mahasangh; (10) Central Provident Fund Commissioner; (11) Registrar, Debts Recovery Tribunal; (12) Asset Reconstruction Company (India) Limited  [BOMBAY HIGH COURT, 08 Jan 2010]
Practice & Procedure - Corporate - Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985, s. 25 - Filing of appeal - Period of limitation – Commencement of - Appeal filed by petitioners was disposed off on the ground that it was barred by limitation - Hence, present petition - Held, Act itself requires that the copy of the order passed by the Bureau of Industrial and Financial Reconstruction is made available to the appellant and it is only after that, that the limitation will commence - In instant case, Appellate Authority did not consider this issue nor recorded a finding as to when copy of order was issued to petitioner - Impugned order set aside - Matter restored to file of Appellate Authority for de novo consideration - Rule made absolute.
Fairdeal Supplies Limited, Represented by Director, Mahesh B. Gor vs (1) Asset Reconstruction Company (India) Limited; (2) Official Liquidator, High Court; (3) South India Viscose National Workers Union (NTUC), Represented by Secretary, K. Arumugam; (4) Veetrag Housing Development and Finance Company Limited, Represented by Director, Sumermal Mishrimal Bafna  [MADRAS HIGH COURT, 07 Jan 2010]
Corporate – Payment of instalment - Extension of time - Appellant/secured creditor made an offer to buy the assets of the winding up company – Company Court accepted the offer – Appellant remitted the EMD amount and first instalment – Appellant sought permission to remove and sell the plant and machinery – Company Court granted the permission to remove the plant and machinery, however, declined to grant the permission for sale – However, Company Court set aside the order of removal of plant and machinery at the instance of another secured creditor at later – Appellant challenged the order before SC – SC granted the permission for removal - Appellant sought time for remitting the second instalment before the Company Court – Company Court granted sixty days of time, however, appellant failed to remit the amount within that time – Appellant sought further time for remittance – Company Court dismissed appellant’s application – Appellant contended that delay in remitting the amount was on account of third party intervention in the matter of removal of plant and machinery from the premises in question – Held, since SC restored the order of Company Court for the removal of plant and machinery, there was no impediment for the appellant to remove the same – However, appellant, although, had sufficient time, defaulted in making the timely payment - It is not the case of the Official Liquidator or the intervened Creditor that the sale price fixed in favour of the appellant was not reasonable – Further, appellant made over one more part payment to the Official Liquidator of the winding up company – Therefore, appellant is entitled to get one more opportunity to pay the remaining amount in view of the facts and circumstances of the case, however, appellant has to compensate the delay properly – Direction issued to the appellant to remit the balance amount within the stipulated time with interest unless the EMD amount deposited would be forfeited – Appeals disposed of.
India Cements Capitals And Finance Limited vs Mares Confectioneries Private Limited  [MADRAS HIGH COURT, 06 Jan 2010]
Sytematix Shares And Stocks (India) Limited vs Vimal Agarwal  [BOMBAY HIGH COURT, 04 Jan 2010]
Arbitration & ADR - Capital Market - Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, s. 34 - Jurisdiction of arbitrator - Arbitral award - Respondent executed a Member­client Agreement and Know­Your­Client Form with petitioner - Dispute arose between the Petitioner and the Respondent arising out of dealings/contracts and transactions - Respondent invoked Arbitration – Award was passed by the Sole Arbitrator, appointed by National Stock Exchange of India Limited (NSEIL) - Present petition u/s. 34 of the Act - (A) Jurisdiction of arbitrator - Held, under the NSEIL Bye­laws, a reference to arbitration is required to be made in case of all claims, differences or disputes between the Trading Members inter­se and between the Trading Members and Constituents arising out of or in relation to the dealings, contracts and transactions made subject to the Bye­Laws, Rules and Regulations of the Exchange or with reference to anything incidental thereto or in pursuance thereof - Arbitration proceedings as provided under these Bye­laws and Regulations are subject to the provisions of the Act to the extent not provided for in these Bye­Laws or Regulations - In present case, arbitration Proceeding, as referred and as decided, is well within the framework of law and the record - Arbitrator has a jurisdiction to decide and deal with the defence/ disputes/ claims between the parties as there was also dispute about the existence of contract between the parties - (B) Arbitral award - Held, arbitrator, correctly concluded and hold that there was no signed documents or agreements and or authorization given by the Petitioner to trade on his behalf by investing Rs.15 lacs in share market - Any purchase/sale of shares without instructions and authority of the client/ constituent by the trading members is impermissible - There was no material to show or placed on record that the trade was ordered by the Respondent - Arbitrator rightly held that the Respondent is not liable for the loss as culminated in his account - In view of this, the decision that the Petitioner entered into the alleged transaction without Respondent’s order in writing, without his consent and without his knowledge and therefore, passed the order of refund is correct - Petition dismissed.
Ritika Private Limited vs Omaxe Construction Limited  [DELHI HIGH COURT, 22 Dec 2009]
Frankfinn Aviation Services Private Limited vs Akash Gupta  [DELHI HIGH COURT, 22 Dec 2009]
European Metal Recycling Limited vs Blue Precision Limited  [DELHI HIGH COURT, 22 Dec 2009]
Ritika Private Limited vs Omaxe Construction Limited  [DELHI HIGH COURT, 22 Dec 2009]
Corporate - Practice & Procedure - Winding up proceedings - Petitioner delivered a notice of winding up alleging that respondent company did not complete construction of Demised Premises/Mall by stipulated time - Petitioner further alleged that more than 20 months have lapsed since date on which Mall was supposed to be constructed and that, till date, petitioner has not been handed over possession of Demised Premises- Respondent did not replied to said notice - Whether winding up order could passes under said circumstances? - Held, respondent’s failure to reply to notice of winding up does not mean that winding up orders must invariably be passed - Notice issued to respondents to show cause why company be not wound up - Order accordingly.
European Metal Recycling Limited vs Blue Engineering Private Limted  [DELHI HIGH COURT, 22 Dec 2009]
Ritika Private Limited vs Omaxe Construction Limited  [DELHI HIGH COURT, 22 Dec 2009]
Thermopack Industries vs Ajay Electrical Industries Limited  [DELHI HIGH COURT, 22 Dec 2009]
K. Periasamy Gounder vs (1) Kothari Industrial Corporation Limited, Represented By Chairman; (2) Kotak Mahindra Bank Limited  [MADRAS HIGH COURT, 22 Dec 2009]
(A) Corporate - Banking & Finance - Applicant entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with 1st respondent-Corporation for discharging their secured debts for a consideration of transfer of three properties in favour of the applicant - Applicant made necessary payments to the debtors of 1st respondent as per the terms of MoU - HC passed an order of winding up of 1st respondent at the instance of the 2nd respondent-Bank (another debtor), in the meantime - 1st respondent challenged the winding up order - HC allowed the 1st respondent's appeal and the petition for winding up was remanded back to the Company Court to proceed in accordance with law - Applicant entered into a supplementary MoU with 1st respondent for a consideration of transfer of another two properties in favour of him - Applicant obtained a conveyance in respect of one property and completed all the necessary steps for the conveyance in respect of another property, however, applicant sought the nod of the HC in the present application for the conveyance of remaining three properties - Held, 2nd respondent had already gone before the Debts Recovery Tribunal (DRT) seeking to enforce the security of their loans and obtained an order of injunction against 1st respondent, however, 2nd respondent has not given up their securities in respect of the dues arising out of the borrowings of 1st respondent - Injunction order of DRT which continues to be in force till date, cannot be superseded by the Company Court granting permission for the sale of the very same properties - Further, properties for the sale of which the present application has been filed, are mortgaged to another Bank and that Bank's application pending before the DRT, hence, permission for the sale of the mortgaged properties free of encumbrances, cannot be granted - No bona fides can be found on the part of the applicant as well as the 1st respondent, in seeking validation for the transfer of two allegedly unencumbered properties and approval for the transfer of three remaining properties - Application dismissed.(B) Corporate - Land & Property - Injunction against transfer of property - 2nd respondent sought injunction restraining the 1st respondent from alienating two specific properties - Held, 1st respondent submitted relevant documents before the Sub Registrar for transferring the properties in question to a third party on the guise that the transfer was in favour of a subsidiary company, however, transferee ceased to be a subsidiary company even prior to the submission of documents for registration - Further, DRT has already granted status quo with respect to the said properties, therefore, there has been a total suppression as well as a violation of the order of status-quo - Since the properties in question were transferred to the so-called subsidiary companies, the injunction is sought by the 1st respondent cannot be granted - However, direction issued to 2nd respondent to furnish full particulars of the whole transaction within the specified time before the HC - Application disposed of.
Commissioner of Income Tax vs Little Flower Kuries and Enterprises Limited  [KERALA HIGH COURT, 22 Dec 2009]
(1) B. V. V. Paper Industries Limited, Represented By Chairman and Administrative Office; (2) B. V. Sathyanarayanamoorthy, Chairman, B. V. V. Paper Industries Limited; (3) B. V. V. S. S. Krishna Prasad; (4) Sumathi K. Prasad vs R. Balasundaram  [MADRAS HIGH COURT, 21 Dec 2009]
(A) Labour & Industrial Law - Criminal - Corporate - Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (SICA), ss. 3(1)(O), 22-A - Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, ss. 138, 141 - 3rd Petitioner issued cheques to respondent in order to settle a liability with respect to the supply of waste paper to the 1st petitioner-industry - Cheques were dishonoured due to insufficiency of funds in the account - Respondent filed criminal complaint against petitioners u/s. 141 of the Act - Petitioners sought quashing of the criminal complaints against them on the ground that the 1st petitioner was declared as sick industry u/s. 3(1)(O) and an order u/s. 22-A of SICA, banning them from dealing with their current assets was passed by the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR) - Held, ban order u/s. 22-A of SICA was not passed before raising the cause of action u/s. 138 of the Act, but the cause of action itself has arisen after the passing of the ban order by the BIFR - Therefore, petitioners cannot be permitted to take refuge under the ban order passed u/s. 22-A of the SICA - (B) Liability of the Director of the sick industry - Whether 4th petitioner-Director is liable for offence committed by the 1st petitioner u/s. 138 of the Act - It is necessary to specifically allege in the complaint the particular role played by the Director of a company in the transaction in question to invoke the provisions of s. 141 of the Act and array such Director as an accused - Held, no averment in the impugned complaint showing that how 4th petitioner is taking part in the affairs of the 1st petitioner - It has not been stated in the complaint that the 4th petitioner took any part in the transaction between the 1st petitioner-industry and the respondent - Therefore, the cognizance taken for the offence u/s. 138 of the Act against 4th petitioner, is bad in law, hence the same is quashed - Petition partly allowed.
(1) Prime Telesystem Limited; (2) Ajit Sarin vs (1) Sasken Communication Technologies Limited and Others; (2) Intel Capital Corporation and Others  [DELHI HIGH COURT, 18 Dec 2009]
Ram Kishan vs Management of American Express Banking Corporation and Another  [DELHI HIGH COURT, 18 Dec 2009]
(1) Indira Gandhi Airport Tdi Karamchari Union; (2) Union Of India And Another; (3) Delhi International Airport Private Limited; (4) Airports Authority Of India vs (1) Union Of India And Others; (2) Indira Gandhi Airport Tdi Karamchari Union And Others  [DELHI HIGH COURT, 18 Dec 2009]
D.C.M. Limited And Another vs Mahabir Singh Rana  [DELHI HIGH COURT, 17 Dec 2009]


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